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The administration of large Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) systems is a challenging prob-
lem. In order to administer such systems, decentralization of administration tasks by the use of
delegation is an eﬀective approach. While the use of delegation greatly enhances ﬂexibility and
scalability, it may reduce the control that an organization has over its resources, thereby dimin-
ishing a major advantage RBAC has over Discretionary Access Control (DAC). We propose to use
security analysis techniques to maintain desirable security properties while delegating administra-
tive privileges. We give a precise deﬁnition of a family of security analysis problems in RBAC,
which is more general than safety analysis that is studied in the literature. We show that two
classes of problems in the family can be reduced to similar analysis in the RT[և,∩] role-based
trust-management language, thereby establishing an interesting relationship between RBAC and
the RT framework. The reduction gives eﬃcient algorithms for answering most kinds of queries
in these two classes and establishes the complexity bounds for the intractable cases.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The administration of large Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) systems is a challenging
problem. A case study carried out with Dresdner Bank, a major European bank, resulted
in an RBAC system that has around 40,000 users and 1300 roles [Schaad et al. 2001]. In
systems of such size, it is impossible for a single system security ofﬁcer (SSO) to admin-
ister the entire system. Several administrative models for RBAC have been proposed in
recent years, e.g., ARBAC97 [Sandhu et al. 1999], ARABCRA02 [Oh and Sandhu 2002],
and CL03 (Crampton and Loizou) [Crampton and Loizou 2003]. In all these models, del-
egation is used to decentralize the administration tasks.
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A major advantage that RBAC has over discretionary access control (DAC) is that if an
organization uses RBAC as its access control model, then the organization (represented
by the SSO in the system) has central control over its resources. This is different from
DAC, in which the creator of a resource determines who can access the resource. In most
organizations, even when a resource is created by an employee, the resource is still owned
by the organization and the organization wants some level of control over how the resource
is to be shared. In most administrative models for RBAC, the SSO delegates to other users
the authority to assign users to certain roles (thereby granting those users certain access
permissions), to remove users from certain roles (thereby revoking certain permissions
thoseusershave), etc. WhiletheuseofdelegationintheadministrationofanRBACsystem
greatly enhances ﬂexibility and scalability, it may reduce the control that the organization
has over its resources, thereby diminishing a major advantage RBAC has over DAC. As
delegation gives a certain degree of control to a user that may be only partially trusted,
a natural security concern is whether the organization nonetheless has some guarantees
about who can access its resources. To the best of our knowledge, the effect of delegation
on the persistence of security properties in RBAC has not been considered in the literature
as such.
In this paper, we propose to use security analysis techniques [Li et al. 2005] to maintain
desirable security properties while delegating administrative privileges. In security analy-
sis, one views an access control system as a state-transition system. In an RBAC system,
state changes occur via administrative operations. Security analysis techniques answer
questions such as whether an undesirable state is reachable, and whether every reachable
state satisﬁes some safety or availability properties. Examples of undesirable states are a
state in which an untrusted user gets access and a state in which a user who is entitled to
an access permission does not get it.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows.
—We give a precise deﬁnition of a family of security analysis problems in RBAC. In
this family, we consider queries that are more general than queries that are considered
in safety analysis [Harrison et al. 1976; Koch et al. 2002a; Lipton and Snyder 1977;
Sandhu 1988].
—We show that two classes of the security analysis problems in RBAC can be reduced to
similar ones in RT[և,∩], a role-based trust-management language for which security
analysis has been studied [Li et al. 2005]. The reduction gives efﬁcient algorithms for
answering most kinds of queries in these two classes and establishes the complexity
bounds for the intractable cases.
Our contributions are signiﬁcant in that our work presents a way to capture and represent
a large class of security properties of interest in complex RBAC systems such as the one
discussed by [Schaad et al. 2001]. Our work also shows how several kinds of these security
properties can be efﬁciently veriﬁed. Our establishment of complexity bounds for the in-
tractable cases gives us a clear understanding of the difﬁculty of the problems so that future
work can develop efﬁcient heuristics. In Section 2.2, we discuss how security analysis is
used in RBAC systems, which further demonstrates the signiﬁcance of our contributions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we deﬁne a family of security
analysis problems in RBAC and summarize our main results. We give an overview of the
results for security analysis in RT[և,∩] in Section 3. We present the reduction from
security analysis in RBAC to that in RT[և,∩] in Section 4. Related work is discussed in
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Section 5. We conclude with Section 6. An appendix contains proofs not included in the
main body.
2. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND MAIN RESULTS
In [Li et al. 2005], an abstract version of security analysis is deﬁned in the context of
trust management. In this section we restate the deﬁnition in the context of general access
control schemes.
Deﬁnition 1. (Access Control Schemes) An access control scheme is modelled as a
state-transition system  Γ,Q,⊢,Ψ , in which Γ is a set of states, Q is a set of queries, Ψ is
a set of state-change rules, and ⊢: Γ×Q → {true,false} is called the entailment relation,
determining whether a query is true or not in a given state. A state, γ ∈ Γ, contains all
the information necessary for making access control decisions at a given time. When a
query, q ∈ Q, arises from an access request, γ ⊢ q means that the access corresponding
to the request q is granted in the state γ, and γ  ⊢ q means that the access corresponding
to q is not granted. One may also ask queries other than those corresponding to a speciﬁc
request, e.g., whether every principal that has access to a resource is an employee of the
organization. Such queries are useful for understanding the properties of a complex access
control system.
A state-change rule, ψ ∈ Ψ, determines how the access control system changes state.
Given two states γ and γ1 and a state-change rule ψ, we write γ  →ψ γ1 if the change from
γ to γ1 is allowed by ψ, and γ
∗  →ψ γ1 if a sequence of zero or more allowed state changes
leads from γ to γ1. If γ
∗  →ψ γ1, we say that γ1 is ψ-reachable from γ, or simply γ1 is
reachable, when γ and ψ are clear from the context.
An example of an access control scheme is the HRU scheme, that is derived from the
work by Harrison et al. [Harrison et al. 1976]. The HRU scheme is based on the access
matrix model [Graham and Denning 1972; Lampson 1971]. We assume the existence of
three countably inﬁnite sets: S, O, and A, which are the sets of all possible subjects,
objects, and access rights. We assume further that S ⊆ O. In the HRU scheme:
—Γ is the set of all possible access matrices. Formally, each γ ∈ Γ is identiﬁed by three
ﬁnite sets, Sγ ⊂ S, Oγ ⊂ O, and Aγ ⊂ A, and a function Mγ[] : Sγ × Oγ →
2Aγ, where Mγ[s,o] gives the set of rights s has over o. An example of a state, γ, is
one in which Sγ = {Admin},Oγ = {employeeData} ∪ Sγ, Aγ = {own,read}, and
Mγ[Admin,Admin] = ∅, and Mγ[Admin,employeeData] = {own,read}. In this state,
two objects exist, of which one is a subject, and the system is associated with the two
rights, own and read.
—Q is the set of all queries of the form: a ∈ [s,o], where a ∈ A is a right, s ∈ S is a
subject, and o ∈ O is an object. This query asks whether the right a exists in the cell
corresponding to subject s and object o.
—The entailment relation is deﬁned as follows: γ ⊢ a ∈ [s,o] if and only if s ∈
Sγ, o ∈ Oγ, and a ∈ Mγ[s,o]. For example, let the query q1 be read ∈
M[Admin,employeeData]. and the query q2 be own ∈ M[Admin,Admin] Then, for
the state, γ, discussed above, γ ⊢ q1 and γ  ⊢ q2.
—Each state-transition rule ψ is given by a set of commands. Given ψ, the change from γ
to γ1 is allowed if there exists command in ψ such that the execution of the command in
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the state γ results in the state γ1. An example of ψ is the following set of commands.
command createObject(s,o) command grant a(s,s′,o)
create object o if own ∈ [s,o]
enter own into [s,o] enter a into [s′,o]
The set of queries is not explicitly speciﬁed in [Harrison et al. 1976]. It is conceivable
to consider other classes of queries, e.g., comparing the set of all subjects that have a given
rightoveragivenobjectwithanothersetofsubjects. Inourframework, HRUwithdifferent
classes of queries can be viewed as different schemes.
Deﬁnition 2. (Security Analysis in an Abstract Setting) Given an access control scheme
 Γ,Q,⊢,Ψ , asecurityanalysisinstancetakes theform γ,q,ψ,Π , whereγ ∈ Γisastate,
q ∈ Q is a query, ψ ∈ Ψ is a state-change rule, and Π ∈ {∃,∀} is a quantiﬁer. An instance
 γ,q,ψ,∃  asks whether there exists γ1 such that γ
∗  →ψ γ1 and γ1 ⊢ q. When the answer
is afﬁrmative, we say q is possible (given γ and ψ). An instance  γ,q,ψ,∀  asks whether
for every γ1 such that γ
∗  →ψ γ1, γ1 ⊢ q. If so, we say q is necessary (given γ and ψ).
For our example HRU scheme from above, adopt γ as the start state. In γ, there is only
one subject (namely, Admin) and the access matrix is empty. The system is associated
with the two rights, own and r. Let the query q be r ∈ M[Alice,employeeData] for
Alice ∈ S and employeeData ∈ O. Let the state-change rule ψ be the set of two commands
createObject and grant r. Then, the security analysis instance  γ,q,ψ,∃  is true. The
reason is that although in the start state γ, Alice does not have the r right over the object
employeeData, there exists a reachable state from γ in which she has such access. The
security analysis instance  γ,q,ψ,∀  is false, as there exists at least one state reachable
from γ (γ itself) that does not entail the query.
Security analysis generalizes safety analysis. As we discuss in the following section,
with security analysis we can study not only safety, but also several other interesting prop-
erties, such as availability and mutual-exclusion.
2.1 A family of security analysis problems in Role-Based Access Control
Wenow deﬁne afamilyofsecurityanalysisproblems inthecontext of RBAC byspecifying
Γ, Q, and ⊢, while leaving Ψ abstract. By considering different possibilities for Ψ, one
obtains different classes of RBAC security analysis problems in this family. We consider
two speciﬁc instances of Ψ in sections 2.3 and 2.4.
We assume a basic level of familiarity with RBAC; readers are referred to [Ferraiolo
etal.2001; Sandhuetal.1996]foranintroductiontoRBAC.Weassumethattherearethree
countable sets: U (the set of all possible users), R (the set of all possible roles), and P (the
set of all possible permissions). The family of analysis problems is given by specializing
the analysis problem deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2 to consider access control schemes that have
Γ, Q, and ⊢ speciﬁed as follows.
States (Γ): Γ is the set of all RBAC states. An RBAC state, γ, is a 3-tuple  UA,PA,RH ,
in which the user assignment relation UA ⊆ U × R associates users with roles, the per-
mission assignment relation PA ⊆ P × R associates permissions with roles, and the role
hierarchy relation RH ⊆ R×R is a partial order among roles in R. We denote the partial
order by  . r1   r2 means that every user who is a member of r1 is also a member of r2
and every permission that is associated with r2 is also associated with r1.
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RH = { (Engineer,Employee),(FullTime,Employee),
(PartTime,Employee),(ProjectLead,Engineer),
(Manager,FullTime) }.
PA = { (Access,Employee),(View,HumanResource),
(Edit,Engineer) }.
UA = { (Alice,PartTime),(Alice,Engineer),
(Bob,Manager),(Carol,HumanResource) }.
Fig. 1. An example RBAC state with a role hierarchy, users and permissions. Roles are shown in
solid boxes, permissions in dashed boxes and users in ovals. A line segment represents a role-role
relationship, the assignment of a permission to a role or the assignment of a user to a role.
EXAMPLE 1. Figure 1 is an example of an RBAC state. It reﬂects an organization that
has engineers, and whose human-resource needs are outsourced (i.e., human-resource per-
sonnel are not employees). Everyone in the organization is an employee, and therefore a
member of the role Employee. Some of the employees are full-time (members of the role
FullTime), and the others are part-time (members of the role PartTime). All managers are
full-time employees. All employees have access to the ofﬁce, and therefore have the per-
mission Access. Engineers may edit code (have the permission Edit), and human resource
personnel may view employee-details (have the permission View).
We now discuss some example members of UA, PA and RH. The user Alice is an en-
gineer who is a part-time employee. Therefore, (Alice,Engineer) and (Alice,PartTime)
are members of UA. All employees have access to the ofﬁce, and therefore,
(Access,Employee) is a member of PA. Project leads are engineers, and therefore
(ProjectLead,Engineer) is a member of RH (i.e., ProjectLead   Engineer).
Given a state γ =  UA, PA, RH , every role has a set of users who are members of that
role and every permission is associated with a set of users who have that permission. We
formalize this by having every state γ deﬁne a function usersγ : R ∪ P → 2U, as follows.
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For any r ∈ R and u ∈ U, u ∈ usersγ[r] if and only if either (u,r) ∈ UA or there exists
r1 such that r1   r and (u,r1) ∈ UA. For any p ∈ P and u ∈ U, u ∈ usersγ[p] if and
only if there exists r1 such that (p,r1) ∈ PA and u ∈ usersγ[r1]. Note that the effect of
permission propagation through the role hierarchy is already taken into consideration by
the deﬁnition of usersγ[r1].
EXAMPLE 2. Let the RBAC state shown in Figure 1 be γ. Then, for the role Engineer,
usersγ[Engineer] = {Alice}. Similarly, for the permission Access, usersγ[Access] =
{Alice,Bob}.
Queries (Q): The purpose of a query is to encode some property of a state that is of
interest. For this, we introduce the notion of user sets by extending our deﬁnition of the
function usersγ. The intuition is as follows. Given a state, a user set evaluates to a set of
users. A query encodes a comparison of user sets, which evaluates (in the entailment of a
query) to a comparison of two sets of users. As we demonstrate, such a representation for
a query is quite powerful; indeed, we are able to capture several properties of interest. The
reason is that properties regarding users, roles and permissions can all be captured using
user sets.
A query q has the form s1 ⊒ s2, where s1,s2 ∈ S, and S is the set of all user sets,
deﬁned to be the least set satisfying the following conditions: (1) R ∪ P ⊆ S, i.e., every
role r and every permission p is a user set; (2) {u1,u2,    ,uk} ∈ S, where k ≥ 0 and
ui ∈ U for1 ≤ i ≤ k, i.e., aﬁnitesetofusersisauserset; and(3)s1∪s2,s1∩s2,(s1) ∈ S,
where s1,s2 ∈ S, i.e., the set of all user sets is closed with respect to union, intersection
and paranthesization. We extend the function usersγ in a straightforward way to give a
valuation for all user sets. The extended function usersγ: S → 2U is deﬁned as follows:
usersγ[{u1,u2,    ,uk}] = {u1,u2,    ,uk}, usersγ[(s)] = usersγ[s], usersγ[s1 ∪ s2] =
usersγ[s1] ∪ usersγ[s2], and usersγ[s1 ∩ s2] = usersγ[s1] ∩ usersγ[s2]. We say a query
s1 ⊒ s2 is semi-static if one of s1,s2 can be evaluated independent of the state, i.e., no
role or permission appears in it. The reason we distinguish semi-static queries is that (as
we assert in Sections 4.1 and 4.2) a security analysis instance involving only such queries
can be solved efﬁciently.
Entailment (⊢): Given a state γ and a query s1 ⊒ s2, γ ⊢ s1 ⊒ s2 if and only if
usersγ[s1] ⊇ usersγ[s2].
EXAMPLE 3. Continuing from the previous examples, an example of a query, q, is
FullTime ∩ Access ⊒ {Alice}, for the role FullTime, the permission Access and the user
Alice. This query issemi-static; the userset{Alice}can be evaluated (toitself)independent
of the state.
The query q asks whether Alice is a full-time employee that has access to the ofﬁce. To
ﬁnd out whether γ entails q or not, we evaluate q as follows. We evaluate the user set
FullTime to the set of users {Bob}. We evaluate the user set Access to the set of users
{Alice,Bob}. We intersect the two sets of users to obtain the set of users {Bob}. The user
set {Alice} does not need further evaluation; it is already a set of users. We now check
whether the set of users {Alice} is a subset of the set of users {Bob} and determine that
γ  ⊢ q. If another query q′ is Edit ⊒ ProjectLead (i.e., whether project leads can edit code),
then γ ⊢ q′.
The state of an RBAC system changes when a modiﬁcation is made to a component of
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 UA,PA,RH . For example, a user may be assigned to a role, or a role hierarchy re-
lationship may be added. In existing RBAC models, both constraints and administrative
models affect state changes in an RBAC system. For example, a constraint may declare
that roles r1 and r2 are mutually exclusive, meaning that no user can be a member of both
roles. If a user u is a member of r1 in a state, then the state is not allowed to change to a
state in which u is a member of r2 as well. An administrative model includes administra-
tive relations that dictates who has the authority to change the various components of an
RBAC state and what are the requirements these changes have to satisfy. Thus, in RBAC
security analysis, a state-change rule may include constraints, administrative relations, and
possibly other information.
In this section, we leave the state-change rule abstract for the following reasons.
First, there are several competing proposals for constraint languages [Ahn and Sandhu
2000; Jaeger and Tidswell 2001; Crampton 2003] and for administrative models in
RBAC [Sandhu et al. 1999; Oh and Sandhu 2002; Crampton and Loizou 2003; Ferraiolo
et al. 2003]; a consensus has not been reached within the community. Furthermore, RBAC
is used in diverse applications. It is conceivable that different applications would use dif-
ferent classes of constraints and/or administrative models; therefore different classes of
problems in this family are of interest.
Given a state γ and a state-change rule ψ, one can ask the following questions using
security analysis.
—Simple Safety : is s ⊒ {u} possible? This asks whether there exists a reachable state in
which the user set s includes the (presumably untrusted) user u. A ‘no’ answer means
that the system is safe.
—Simple Availability : is s ⊒ {u} necessary? This asks whether in every reachable state,
the (presumably trusted) user u is always included in the user set s. A ‘yes’ answer
means that the resources associated with the user set s are always available to the user
u.
—Bounded Safety : is {u1,u2,...,un} ⊒ s necessary? This asks whether in every reach-
able state, the user set s is bounded by the set of users {u1,u2,...,un}. A ‘yes’ answer
means that the system is safe. A special case of bounded safety is Mutual Exclusion,
which asks: is ∅ ⊒ (s1 ∩ s2) necessary? This asks whether in every reachable state, no
user is a member of both user sets s1 and s2. A ‘yes’ answer means that the two user
sets are mutually exclusive.
—Liveness : is ∅ ⊒ s possible? This asks whether the user set s always has at least one
user. A ‘no’ answer means that the liveness of the resources associated with s holds in
the system.
—Containment : is s1 ⊒ s2 necessary? This asks whether in every reachable state, every
user in the user set s2 is in the user set s1. Containment can be used to express a
safety property, in which case, a ‘yes’ answer means that the safety property holds. An
example of containment for the RBAC state in Figure 1 and some state-change rule is:
“is Employee ⊒ Access necessary?”, for the role Employee and the permission Access.
This asks whether in every reachable state, every user who has the permission Access
(i.e., has access to the ofﬁce) is a member of the role Employee (i.e., is an employee). A
‘yes’ answer means that our desired safety property holds.
Containment can express availability properties also. E.g., “is Access ⊒ Employee
necessary?” asks whether the permission Access (i.e., access to the ofﬁce) is always
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.8  
available to members of the role Employee (i.e., employees). A ‘yes’ answer means that
the availability property holds.
We point out that that all the above properties (except for containment) use semi-static
queries, and therefore, as we mention in the context of queries in this section, we can
efﬁciently determine whether those properties are satisﬁed.
2.2 Usage of RBAC security analysis
In an RBAC security analysis instance  γ,q,ψ,Π , the state γ fully determines who can
access which resources. In addition to administrative policy information, the state-change
rule ψ also contains information about which users are trusted. In any access control
system there are trusted users; these are users who have the authority to take the system
to a state that violates security requirements but are trusted not to do so. An SSO is an
example of a trusted user.
Security analysis provides a means to ensure that security requirements (such as safety
and availability) are always met, as long as users identiﬁed as trusted behave according to
the usage patterns discussed in this section. In other words, security analysis helps ensure
that the security of the system does not depend on users other than those that are trusted.
Each security requirement is formalized as a security analysis instance, together with an
answer that is acceptable for secure operation. For example, in the context of the RBAC
system whose state in shown in Figure 1, a security requirement may be that only employ-
ees may access the ofﬁce. This can be formalized as an instance  γ,q,ψ,∀ , where γ is the
current state, q is Employee ⊒ Access, and ψ speciﬁes administrative policy information.
The rule ψ should precisely capture the capabilities of users that are not trusted. In other
words, any change that could be made by such users should be allowed by ψ. The rule
ψ could restrict the changes that trusted users can make, because these are trusted not to
make a change without verifying that desirable security properties are maintained subse-
quent to the change. For the example discussed above, the acceptable answer is “yes”, as
we want to ensure that everyone who has the permission Access is an employee. The goal
is to ensure that such a security requirement is always satisﬁed.
Suppose that the system starts in a state γ such that the answer to  γ,q,ψ,∀  is “yes”.
Further, suppose a trusted user (such as the SSO) attempts to make a change that is not
allowed by ψ, e.g., the SSO decides to grant certain administrative privileges to a user
u. Before making the change, SSO performs security analysis  γ′,q,ψ′,∀ , where γ′ and
ψ′ are resulted from the prospective change. Only if the answer is “yes”, does the SSO
actually make the change. The fact that ψ limits the SSO from making changes does not
mean that we require that the SSO never make such changes. It reﬂects the requirement
that the SSO perform security analysis and make only those changes that do not violate
security properties.
This way, as long as trusted users are cooperating, the security of an access control
system is preserved. One can delegate administrative privileges to partially trusted users
with the assurance that desirable security properties always hold. By using different ψ’s,
one can evaluate which sets of users are trusted for a given security property. In general, it
is impossible to completely eliminate the need to trust people. However, security analysis
enables one to ensure that the extent of this trust is well understood.
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2.3 Assignment and trusted users (AATU)
In this paper, we present solutions to two classes of security analysis problems in RBAC.
Both classes use variants of the URA97 component of the ARBAC97 administrative model
for RBAC [Sandhu et al. 1999]. URA97 speciﬁes how the UA relation may change.
The ﬁrst class is called Assignment And Trusted Users (AATU), in which a state-change
rule ψ has the form  can assign,T . The relation can assign ⊆ R × C × 2R determines
who can assign users to roles and the preconditions these users have to satisfy. C is the set
of conditions, which are expressions formed using roles, the two operators ∩ and ∪, and
parentheses.  ra,c,rset  ∈ can assign means that members of the role ra can assign any
user whose role memberships satisfy the condition c, to any role r ∈ rset. For example,
 r0,(r1 ∪ r2) ∩ r3,{r4,r5}  ∈ can assign means that a user that is a member of the role
r0 is allowed to assign a user that is a member of at least one of r1 and r2, and is also a
member of r3, to be a member of r4 or r5. T ⊆ U is a set of trusted users; these users are
assumed not to initiate any role assignment operation for the purpose of security analysis.
The set T is allowed to be empty.
Deﬁnition 3. (Assignment And Trusted Users – AATU) The class AATU is given by
parameterizing the family of RBAC analysis problems in Section 2.1 with the following
set of state-change rules. Each state-change rule ψ has the form  can assign,T  such
that a state change from γ =  UA,PA,RH  to γ1 =  UA1,PA1,RH 1  is allowed by
ψ =  can assign,T  if PA = PA1, RH = RH 1, UA1 = UA ∪ {(u,r)}, where (u,r)  ∈
UA and there exists (ra,c,rset) ∈ can assign such that r ∈ rset, u satisﬁes c, and
usersγ[ra]  ⊆ T (i.e., there exists at least one user who is a member of the role ra and is not
in T, so that such a user can perform the assignment operation).
EXAMPLE 4. In this example, we consider the question of whether a particular user,
Alice, can become a ProjectLead given a system in AATU. In our example, we do not
want Alice to become a ProjectLead unless the trusted administrator Carol is involved. We
encode this question as a security analysis instance.
For the state, γ, shown in Figure 1 and discussed in the previous examples, a state-
change rule, ψ, in the class AATU is  can assign,T , where
can assign = { Manager,Engineer ∧ FullTime,{ProjectLead} ,
 HumanResource,true,{FullTime,PartTime} }
T = {Carol}
That is, ψ authorizes managers to assign a user to the role ProjectLead provided that the
user is a member of the roles Engineer and FullTime. In addition, ψ authorizes anyone
that is a member of the role HumanResource to assign users to the roles FullTime and
PartTime. Setting T to {Carol} implies that we wish to analyze what kinds of states can
be reached via changes made by users other than Carol.
Let q be the query ProjectLead ⊒ {Alice}. Then, γ  ⊢ q. The analysis instance
 γ,q,ψ,∃  asks whether there exists a reachable state in which Alice is a project lead.
The instance is false. This is because for Alice to become a member of ProjectLead, she
would ﬁrst need to be a full-time employee, and only Carol can grant anyone membership
to FullTime. As Carol is in T, she cannot initiate any operation. If we consider, instead,
the state-change rule ψ′, with the same can assign as ψ from above, but with T = ∅, then
the analysis instance  γ,q,ψ′,∃  is true.
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Main results for AATU
—If q is semi-static (see Section 2.1), then an AATU instance  γ,q,ψ,Π  can be answered
efﬁciently, i.e., in time polynomial in the size of the instance.
—Answering general AATU instances  γ,q,ψ,∀  is decidable but intractable (coNP-
complete).
2.4 Assignment and revocation (AAR)
In this class, a state-change rule ψ has the form  can assign,can revoke , where
can assign is the same as in AATU, and can revoke ⊆ R × 2R determines who can
remove users from roles. That  ra,rset  ∈ can revoke means that the members of role
ra can remove a user from a role r ∈ rset. No explicit set of trusted users is speciﬁed
in AAR, unlike AATU. In AATU and AAR, the relations can assign and can revoke are
ﬁxed in ψ. This means that we are assuming that changes to these two relations are made
only by trusted users.
Deﬁnition 4. (Assignment And Revocation – AAR) The class AAR is given by para-
meterizing the family of RBAC analysis problems in Section 2.1 with the following set
of state-change rules. Each state-change rule ψ has the form  can assign,can revoke 
such that a state-change from γ =  UA,PA,RH  to γ1 =  UA1,PA1,RH 1  is al-
lowed by ψ =  can assign,can revoke  if PA = PA1, RH = RH 1, and either (1)
UA1 = UA ∪ {(u,r)} where (u,r)  ∈ UA and there exists (ra,c,rset) ∈ can assign
such that r ∈ rset, u satisﬁes c, and usersγ[ra]  = ∅, i.e., the user u being assigned to
r is not already a member of r and satisﬁes the precondition c, and there is at least one
user that is a member of the role ra that can perform the assignment operation; or (2)
UA1 ∪ (u,r) = UA where (u,r)  ∈ UA1, and there exists (ra,rset) ∈ can revoke such
that r ∈ rset and usersγ[ra]  = ∅, i.e., there exists at least one user in the role ra that can
revoke the user u’s membership in the role r.
We assume that an AAR instance satisﬁes the following three properties. (1) The admin-
istrative roles are not affected by can assign and can revoke. The administrative roles are
given by those that appear in the ﬁrst component of any can assign or can revoke tuple.
These roles should not appear in the last component of any can assign or can revoke
tuple. This condition is easily satisﬁed in URA97, as it assumes the existence of a set of
administrative roles that is disjoint from the set of normal roles. (2) If a role is an adminis-
trative role (i.e., appears as the ﬁrst component of a can assign or can revoke tuple), then
it has at least one user assigned to it. This is reasonable, as an administrative role with no
members has no effect on the system’s protection state. (3) If a can assign tuple exists for
a role, then a can revoke tuple also exists for that role.
EXAMPLE 5. In this example, we ask whether it is possible that only project leads have
access to the ofﬁce, and whether Alice can ever edit code, both in the same AAR system.
The former is an example of an availability question while the latter is an example of a
safety question. We encode both questions as security analysis instances.
For the state, γ, from Figure 1, an example of a state-change rule in AAR is ψ =
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 can assign,can revoke , where
can assign = { Manager,Engineer ∧ FullTime,{ProjectLead} ,
 HumanResource,true,{FullTime,PartTime} }
can revoke = { Manager,{ProjectLead,Engineer} ,
 HumanResource,{FullTime,PartTime} }
We point out that the can assign we use in this example is the same as the can assign we
use in Example 4. Then, if q is the query ProjectLead ⊒ Access (i.e., only project leads
have access to the ofﬁce), the AAR analysis instance  γ,q,ψ,∃  is true. If q′ is the query
Edit ⊒ {Alice} (i.e., Alice can edit code), then the analysis instance  γ,q′,ψ,∀  is false.
Main results for AAR
—If q is semi-static (see Section 2.1), then an AAR instance  γ,q,ψ,Π  can be answered
efﬁciently, i.e., in time polynomial in the size of the instance.
—Answering general AAR instances  γ,q,ψ,∀  is coNP-complete.
2.5 Discussion of the deﬁnitions
Our speciﬁcations of can assign and can revoke are from URA97, which is one of the
three components of ARBAC97 [Sandhu et al. 1999]. The state-change rules considered
in AAR are similar to those in URA97, but they differ in the following two ways. One,
URA97 allows negation of roles to be used in a precondition; AAR does not allow this.
Two, URA97 has separate administrative roles; AAR does not require the complete sep-
aration of administrative roles from ordinary roles. AATU differs from URA97 in two
additional ways. One, AATU does not have revocation rules. Two, AATU has a set of
trusted users, which does not exist in URA97.
The other components of ARBAC97 are PRA97 and RRA97, for administering
permission-role assignment/revocation, and the role hierarchy, respectively. In this paper,
we study the effect of decentralizing user-role assignment and revocation, and assume that
changes to the permission-role assignment relation and the role hierarchy are centralized,
i.e, made only by trusted users. In other words, whoever is allowed to make changes to
permission-role assignment and the role hierarchy will run the security analysis and only
make changes that do not violate the security properties. The administration of the user-
role relation is most likely to be delegated, as that is the component of an RBAC state that
changes most frequently.
AATU and AAR represent two basic cases of security analysis in RBAC. Although
we believe that they are useful cases, they are only the starting point. Many other more
sophisticated cases of security analysis in RBAC remain open. For example, it is not
clear how to deal with negative preconditions in role assignment, and how to deal with
constraints such as mutually exclusive roles.
3. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY ANALYSIS IN RT[և,∩]
In [Li et al. 2005], Li et al. study security analysis in the context of the RT family of Role-
based Trust-management languages [Li et al. 2002; Li et al. 2003]. In particular, security
analysis in RT[և,∩] and its sub-languages is studied. RT[և,∩] is a slightly simpliﬁed
(yet expressively equivalent) version of the RT0 language introduced in [Li et al. 2003]
(RT[և,∩] is called SRT in [Li et al. 2005]). In this section we summarize the results for
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Simple Member
syntax: K.r ←− K1
meaning: members(K.r) ⊇ {K1}
LP clause: m(K,r,K1)
Simple Inclusion
syntax: K.r ←− K1.r1
meaning: members(K.r) ⊇ members(K1.r1)
LP clause: m(K,r,?Z) :− m(K1,r1,?Z)
Linking Inclusion
syntax: K.r ←− K.r1.r2
meaning: members(K.r) ⊇
S
K1∈K.r1 members(K1.r2)
LP clause: m(K,r,?Z) :− m(K,r1,?Y ), m(?Y,r2,?Z)
Intersection Inclusion
syntax: K.r ←− K1.r1 ∩ K2.r2
meaning: members(K.r) ⊇ members(K1.r1) ∩ members(K2.r2)
LP clause: m(K,r,?Z) :− m(K1,r1,?Z), m(K2,r2,?Z)
Fig. 2. Statements in RT[և,∩]. There are four types of statements. For each type, we
give the syntax, the intuitive meaning of the statement, and the LP (Logic-Programming)
clause corresponding to the statement. The clause uses one ternary predicate m, where
m(K,r,K1) means that K1 is a member of the role K.r Symbols that start with “?” rep-
resent logical variables.
security analysis in RT[և,∩]. We summarize the concepts from and results for RT[և,∩]
so that we can leverage those results in the security analysis of the RBAC schemes we
consider in this paper (AATU and AAR). In Section 4 we reduce security analysis in AATU
and AAR to that in RT[և,∩].
3.0.0.1 Syntax of RT[և,∩] . The most important concept in the RT languages is also
that of roles. A role in RT[և,∩] is denoted by a principal (corresponding to a user in
RBAC) followed by a role name, separated by a dot. For example, when K is a principal
and r is a role name, K.r is a role. Each principal has its own name space for roles. For
example, the ‘employee’ role of one company is different from the ‘employee’ role of
another company. A role has a value which is a set of principals that are members of the
role.
Each principal K has the authority to designate the members of a role of the form
K.r. Roles are deﬁned by statements. Figure 2 shows the four types of statements in
RT[և,∩]; each corresponds to a way of deﬁning role membership. A simple-member
statement K.r ←− K1 means that K1 is a member of K’s r role. This is similar to a
user assignment in RBAC. A simple inclusion statement K.r ←− K1.r1 means that K’s
r role includes (all members of) K1’s r1 role. This is similar to a role-role dominance re-
lationship K1.r1   K.r. A linking inclusion statement K.r ←− K.r1.r2 means that K.r
includes K1.r2 for every K1 that is a member of K.r1. An intersection inclusion state-
ment K.r ←− K1.r1∩K2.r2 means that K.r includes every principal who is a member of
both K1.r1 and K2.r2. Linking and intersection inclusion statements do not directly cor-
respond to constructs in RBAC, but they are useful in expressing memberships in roles that
result from administrative operations. Our reduction algorithms in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 use
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linking and intersection inclusion statements to capture user-role memberships affected by
administrative operations.
3.0.0.2 States. An RT[և,∩] state γT consists of a set of RT[և,∩] statements. The
semantics of RT[և,∩] is given by translating each statement into a datalog clause. (Dat-
alog is a restricted form of logic programming (LP) with variables, predicates, and con-
stants, but without function symbols.) See Figure 2 for the datalog clauses corresponding
to RT[և,∩] statements. We call the datalog program resulting from translating each state-
ment in γT into a clause that is the semantic program of γT, denoted by SP(γT).
Given a datalog program, DP, its semantics can be deﬁned through several equivalent
approaches. The model-theoretic approach views DP as a set of ﬁrst-order sentences and
uses the minimal Herbrand model as the semantics. We write SP(γT) |= m(K,r,K′)
when m(K,r,K′) is in the minimal Herbrand model of SP(γT).
3.0.0.3 State-change Rules. A state-change rule is of the form ψT = (G,S), where G
and S are ﬁnite sets of roles.
—Roles in G are called growth-restricted (or g-restricted); no statements deﬁning these
roles can be added. (A statement deﬁnes a role if it has the role to the left of ‘←−’.)
Roles not in G are called growth-unrestricted (or g-unrestricted).
—Roles in S are called shrink-restricted (or s-restricted); statements deﬁning these roles
cannot be removed. Roles not in S are called shrink-unrestricted (or s-unrestricted).
3.0.0.4 Queries. Li et al. [Li et al. 2005] consider the following three forms of queries:
— Membership: A.r ⊒ {D1,...,Dn}
Intuitively, this means that all the principals D1,...,Dn are mem-
bers of A.r. Formally, γT ⊢ A.r ⊒ {D1,...,Dn} if and only if
{Z | SP(γT) |= m(A,r,Z)} ⊇ {D1,...,Dn}.
— Boundedness: {D1,...,Dn} ⊒ A.r
Intuitively, this means that the member set of A.r is bounded by the given set of prin-
cipals. Formally, γT ⊢ {D1,...,Dn} ⊒ A.r if and only if {D1,...,Dn} ⊇ {Z |
SP(γT) |= m(A,r,Z)}.
— Inclusion: X.u ⊒ A.r
Intuitively, this means that all the members of A.r are also members of X.u. Formally,
γT ⊢ X.u ⊒ A.r if and only if {Z | SP(γT) |= m(X,u,Z)} ⊇ {Z | SP(γT) |=
m(A,r,Z)}.
Each form of query can be generalized to allow compound role expressions that use
linking and intersection. These generalized queries can be reduced to the forms above by
adding new roles and statements to the state. For instance, {} ⊒ A.r ∩ A1.r1.r2 can be
answered by adding B.u1 ←− A.r ∩ B.u2, B.u2 ←− B.u3.r2, and B.u3 ←− A1.r1 to
γT, in which B.u1, B.u2, and B.u3 are new g/s-restricted roles, and by posing the query
{} ⊒ B.u1.
Main results for security analysis in RT[և,∩]
Membership and boundedness queries (both whether a query is possible and whether
a query is necessary) can be answered in time polynomial in the size of the input. The
approach taken in [Li et al. 2005] uses logic programs to derive answers to those security
analysis problems. This approach exploits the fact that RT[և,∩] is monotonic in the sense
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that more statements will derive more role membership facts. This follows from the fact
that the semantic program is a positive logic program.
Inclusion queries are more complicated than the other two kinds. In [Li et al. 2005],
only the ∀ case (i.e., whether an inclusion query is necessary) is studied. It is not clear
what the security intuition is of an ∃ inclusion query (whether an inclusion query is pos-
sible); therefore, it is not studied in [Li et al. 2005]. The problem of deciding whether an
inclusion query is necessary, i.e., whether the set of members of one role is always a super-
set of the set of members of another role is called containment analysis. It turns out that
the computational complexity of containment analysis depends on the language features.
In RT[ ], the language that allows only simple member and simple inclusion statements,
containment analysis is in P. It becomes more complex when additional policy language
features are used. Containment analysis is coNP-complete for RT[∩] (RT[ ] plus intersec-
tion inclusion statements), PSPACE-complete for RT[և] (RT[ ] plus linking inclusion
statements), and decidable in coNEXP for RT[և,∩].
4. SOLVING AATU AND AAR BY REDUCTIONS TO SECURITY ANALYSIS IN
RT[և,∩]
In this section, we solve AATU (Deﬁnition 3) and AAR (Deﬁnition 4). Our approach is
to reduce each of them to security analysis in RT[և,∩]. Each reduction is an efﬁciently
computable mapping from an instance of AATU/AAR to a security analysis instance in
RT[և,∩]. We precisely articulate the properties of the reductions in Propositions 1 and 4
respectively. Intuitively, the reductions preserve the results of security analysis across the
mapping.
4.1 Reduction for AATU
The reduction algorithm AATU Reduce is given in Figure 4; it uses the subroutines
deﬁned in Figure 3. Given an AATU instance  γ =  UA,PA,RH , q = s1 ⊒ s2,
ψ =  can assign,T , Π ∈ {∃,∀} , AATU Reduce takes  γ,q,ψ  and outputs
 γT,qT,ψT  such that the RT[և,∩] analysis instance  γT,qT,ψT,Π  has the same
answer as the original AATU instance.
In the reduction, we use one principal for every user that appears in γ, and the spe-
cial principal Sys to represent the RBAC system. The RT[և,∩] role names used in the
reduction include the RBAC roles and permissions in γ and some additional temporary
role names. The RT[և,∩] role Sys.r represents the RBAC role r and the RT[և,∩]
role Sys.p represents the RBAC permission p. Each (u,r) ∈ UA is translated into the
RT[և,∩] statement Sys.r ←− u. Each r1   r2 is translated into the RT[և,∩] state-
ment Sys.r2 ←−Sys.r1 (as r1 is senior to r2, any member of r1 is also a member of r2.)
Each (p,r) ∈ PA is translated into Sys.p ←− Sys.r (each member of the role r has the
permission p.)
The translation of the can assign relation is less straightforward. Each  ra,rc,r  ∈
can assign is translated into the RT[և,∩] statement Sys.r ←− Sys.ra.r ∩ Sys.rc. The
intuition is that a user ua who is a member of the role ra assigning the user u to be a
member of the r role is represented as adding the RT[և,∩] statement ua.r←−u. As ua is
a member of the Sys.ra role, the user u is added as a member to the Sys.r role if and only
if the user u is also a member of the rc role.
In the reduction, all the Sys roles (i.e., Sys.x) are ﬁxed (i.e., both g-restricted and s-
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1 Subroutine Trans(s, γ
T) {
2 /* Trans(s,γ
T) returns an RT[և,∩] role corresponding
3 to the user set s*/
4 if s is an RBAC role then return Sys.s;
5 else if s is an RBAC permission then return Sys.s;
6 else if s is a set of users then {
7 name=newName(); foreach u ∈ s {
8 γ
T+= Sys.name←−u;}
9 return Sys.name; }
10 else if (s = s1 ∪ s2) then {
11 name=newName(); γ
T+=Sys.name←−Trans(s1,γ
T);
12 γ
T+= Sys.name←−Trans(s2,γ
T);
13 return Sys.name; }
14 else if (s = s1 ∩ s2) then {
15 name=newName();
16 γ
T+=Sys.name←−Trans(s1,γ
T) ∩ Trans(s2,γ
T);
17 return Sys.name; }
18 } /* End Trans */
19
20 Subroutine QTrans(s, γ
T) {
21 /* Translation for users sets that are used at top
22 level in a query */
23 if s is a set of users then return s;
24 else return Trans(s,γ
T);
25 } /* End QTrans */
26
27 Subroutine HTrans(s, γ
T) {
28 if s is an RBAC role then return HSys.s;
29 else if (s = s1 ∪ s2) then {
30 name=newName(); γ
T+= Sys.name←−HTrans(s1,γ
T);
31 γ
T+= Sys.name←−HTrans(s2,γ
T); return Sys.name; }
32 else if (s = s1 ∩ s2) then {
33 name=newName();
34 γ
T+=Sys.name←−HTrans(s1,γ
T) ∩ HTrans(s2,γ
T);
35 return Sys.name; }
36 } /* End HTrans */
Fig. 3. Subroutines Trans, QTrans, and HTrans are used by the two reduction algorithms. We assume call-by-
reference for the parameter γT.
restricted). In addition, for each trusted user u in T, all the roles starting with u is also
g-restricted; this is because we assume that trusted users will not perform operations to
change the state (i.e., user-role assignment operations). We may also make roles starting
with trusted users s-restricted; however, this has no effect as no statement deﬁning these
roles exists in the initial state.
EXAMPLE 6. Consider the state-change rule ψ we discuss in Example 4, in which
can assign consists of the two tuples  Manager,Engineer ∧ FullTime,ProjectLead  and
 HumanResource,true,{FullTime,PartTime} , and T = {Carol}. Let γ be the RBAC
state shown in Figure 1, and let q be the query ProjectLead ⊒ Alice. Then, we represent the
output of AATU Reduce( γ,q,ψ ) as  γT,qT,ψT . qT is Sys.ProjectLead ⊒ {Alice}.
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37 AATU Reduce (  γ =  UA,PA,RH , q = s1 ⊒ s2, ψ =  can assign,T   )
38 {
39 /* Reduction algorithm for AATU */
40
41 γ
T = ∅; q
T = QTrans(s1,γ
T)⊒QTrans(s2,γ
T);
42 foreach (ui,rj) ∈ UA { γ
T+= Sys.rj ←−ui; }
43 foreach (ri,rj) ∈ RH { γ
T+= Sys.rj ←−Sys.ri; }
44 foreach (pi,rj) ∈ PA { γ
T+= Sys.pi←−Sys.rj; }
45 foreach (ai,s,rset) ∈ can assign {
46 if (s==true) { foreach r ∈ rset {
47 γ
T+= Sys.r←−Sys.ai.r; } }
48 else { tmpRole=Trans(s,γ
T);
49 foreach r ∈ rset { name=newName();
50 γ
T+= Sys.name←−Sys.ai.r;
51 γ
T+= Sys.r←−Sys.name ∩ tmpRole
52 } } }
53 foreach RT role name x appearing in γ
T {
54 G+=Sys.x; S+=Sys.x; foreach user u ∈ T { G+=u.x; } }
54 return  γ
T, q
T, (G,S) ;
55 } /* End AATU Reduce */
Fig. 4. Reduction Algorithm for AATU
The following RT statements in γT result from UA:
Sys.Engineer ←− Alice Sys.PartTime ←− Alice
Sys.Manager ←− Bob Sys.HumanResource ←− Carol
The following statements in γT result from RH:
Sys.Employee ←− Sys.Engineer Sys.Employee ←− Sys.FullTime
Sys.Employee ←− Sys.PartTime Sys.Engineer ←− Sys.ProjectLead
Sys.FullTime ←− Sys.Manager
The following statements in γT result from PA:
Sys.View ←− Sys.HumanResource Sys.Access ←− Sys.Employee
Sys.Edit ←− Sys.Engineer
The following statements in γT result from can assign. The ﬁrst two statements reﬂect
the ability of a member of HumanResource to assign users to FullTime and PartTime with
no precondition, and the remaining statements reﬂect the ability of a member of Manager
to assign users to ProjectLead provided that they are already members of FullTime and
Engineer.
Sys.FullTime ←− Sys.HumanResource.FullTime
Sys.PartTime ←− Sys.HumanResource.PartTime
Sys.NewRole1 ←− Sys.Engineer ∩ Sys.FullTime
Sys.NewRole2 ←− Sys.Manager.ProjectLead
Sys.ProjectLead ←− Sys.NewRole1 ∩ Sys.NewRole2
γT =  G,S , where G is the growth-restricted set of roles, and S is the shrink-restricted
set of roles. G consists of every role of the form Sys.x and every role of the form Carol.x.
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The latter is included in G because Carol is in the set of trusted users T. S consists of every
role of the form Sys.x. It is clear that the security analysis instance  γT,qT,ψT,∃  is false,
as Alice can never become a member of Sys.ProjectLead. If we adopt as the state-change
rule ψT
1 , that is the same as ψT except that T = ∅, then roles of the form Carol.x would be
growth-unrestricted. And there exists a state γT
1 that is reachable from γT which has the
following statements in addition to all the statements in γT.
Carol.FullTime ←− Alice Bob.ProjectLead ←− Alice
These statements are necessary and sufﬁcient for Sys.ProjectLead ←− Alice to be inferred
in γT
1 . Thus, the security analysis instance  γT,qT,ψT
1 ,∃  is true.
The following proposition asserts that the reduction is sound, meaning that one can use
RT security analysis techniques to answer RBAC security analysis problems.
PROPOSITION 1. Given an AATU instance  γ,q,ψ,Π , let  γT,qT,ψT  =
AATU Reduce( γ,q,ψ ), then:
—Assertion 1: For every RBAC state γ′ such that γ
∗  →ψ γ′, there exists an RT[և,∩] state
γT ′ such that γT ∗  →ψT γT ′ and γ′ ⊢ q if and only if γT ′ ⊢ qT.
—Assertion 2: For every RT[և,∩] state γT ′ such that γT ∗  →ψT γT ′, there exists an RBAC
state γ′ such that γ
∗  →ψ γ′ and γ′ ⊢ q if and only if γT ′ ⊢ qT.
See Appendix A.1 for the proof. As we discuss in detail in [Tripunitara and Li 2004],
the above proposition asserts that AATU Reduce is security-preserving in the sense that an
AATU analysis instance is true if and only if the RT[և,∩] analysis instance that is the out-
put of AATU Reduce is true. That is, AATU Reduce preserves the answer to every security
analysis instance. We argue the need for assertion 1 in the proposition by considering the
case that there exists a reachable state γ′ in the RBAC system, but no corresponding reach-
able state γT ′ in the RT[և,∩] system produced by AATU Reduce. Let the corresponding
query be q. If γ′ ⊢ q, then let Π be ∃, and if γ′  ⊢ q, then let Π be ∀. In the former case, the
security analysis instance in RBAC is true, but the instance in the RT[և,∩] system that is
the output of AATU Reduce is false. In the latter case, the analysis instance in RBAC is
false, but the instance in RT[և,∩] is true. Therefore, for AATU Reduce to preserve the
answer to every analysis instance, we need assertion 1.
Similarly, we argue the need for assertion 2 by considering the contrary situation. Let
γT ′ be a reachable state in RT[և,∩] for which there exists no corresponding state in
RBAC. Let the corresponding query in RT[և,∩] be qT. If γT ′ ⊢ qT, then let Π be ∃, and
let Π be ∀ otherwise. Again, AATU Reduce would not preserve the answer to a security
analysis instance, and we would not be able to use the answer to an analysis instance in
RT[և,∩] as the answer to the corresponding instance in RBAC.
THEOREM 2. An AATU instance  γ,q,ψ,Π  can be solved efﬁciently, i.e., in time poly-
nomial in the size of the instance, if q is semi-static.
PROOF. Let the output of AATU Reduce corresponding to the input  γ,q,ψ  be
 γT,qT,ψT . If q is semi-static, we observe that qT is semi-static as well. Furthermore,
AATU Reduce runs in time polynomial in its input. We know from Li et al. [Li et al. 2005]
that in RT[և,∩], a security analysis instance with a semi-static query can be answered in
time polynomial in the size of γT. Therefore, in conjunction with Proposition 1, we can
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conclude that a security analysis instance with a semi-static query in the RBAC system can
be answered in time polynomial in the size of the system (i.e., the size of  γ,q,ψ ).
THEOREM 3. An AATU instance  γ,q,ψ,Π  is coNP-complete.
PROOF. We show that the general AATU problem is coNP-hard by reducing the
monotone 3SAT problem to the complement of the AATU problem. Monotone 3SAT is
the problem of determining whether a boolean expression in conjunctive normal form with
at most three literals in each clause such that the literals in a clause are either all positive
or all negative, is satisﬁable. Monotone 3SAT is known to be NP-complete [Garey and
Johnson 1979].
Let φ be an instance of monotone 3SAT. Then φ = c1 ∧ ...cl ∧ cl+1 ∧ ... ∧ cn where
c1, ..., cl are the clauses with positive literals, and cl+1, ..., cn are the clauses with
negative literals. Let p1,...,ps be all the propositional variables in φ. For each clause with
negative literals ck = (¬ pk1 ∨ ¬ pk2 ∨ ¬ pk3), deﬁne dk = ¬ ck = (pk1 ∧ pk2 ∧ pk3).
Then, φ is satisﬁable if and only if c1 ∧ ...cl ∧ ¬(dl+1 ∨ ... ∨ dn) is satisﬁable. Let
η = (c1 ∧ ... ∧ cl) → (dl+1 ∨ ... ∨ dn) where → is logical implication. Then, c1 ∧
...cl ∧ ¬(dl+1 ∨ ... ∨ dn) = ¬ η. Therefore, φ is satisﬁable if and only if η is not valid.
We now construct γ, ψ and q in an AATU instance such that q = z1 ⊒ z2 is true for user
sets z1 and z2 in all states reachable from γ if and only if η is valid.
In γ, we have a role a (which is for administrators) and UA contains (A,a) where A is
a user (i.e., the role a is not empty in terms of user-membership). With each propositional
variable pi in η, we associate a role ri. For each ri, we add  a,true,ri  to can assign.
That is, anyone can be assigned to the role ri. We let T (the set of trusted users) be empty.
For each j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ l, we associate the clause cj = (pj1 ∨ pj2 ∨ pj3), with a user
set sj = (rj1 ∪ rj2 ∪ rj3). For each k such that (l + 1) ≤ k ≤ n, we associate the clause
dk = (pk1 ∧ pk2 ∧ pk3), with a user set sk = (rk1 ∩ rk2 ∩ rk3). In our query q = z1 ⊒ z2,
we let z1 = sl+1 ∪ ... ∪ sn and z2 = s1 ∩ ... ∩ sl. We now need to show that z1 ⊒ z2 in
every state reachable from γ if and only if η is valid. We show that z1 ⊒ z2 is not true in
every state reachable from γ if and only if η is not valid.
For the “only if” part, we assume that there exists a state γ′ that is reachable from γ
such that in γ′ there exists a user u that is a member of the user set z2, but not z1. Consider
a truth-assignment I for the propositional variables in η as follows: if u is a member of
the role ri in γ′, then I(pi) = true. Otherwise, I(pi) = false. Under I, η is not true, as
(c1 ∧ ... ∧ cl) is true, but (dl+1 ∨ ... ∨ dn) is false. Therefore, η is not valid.
For the “if” part, we assume thatη isnot valid. Therefore, there exists a truth-assignment
I such that (c1 ∧ ... ∧ cl) is true, but (dl+1 ∨ ... ∨ dn) is false. Consider a state γ′ that
has the following members in UA in addition to the ones in γ: for each pi that is true under
I, (u,ri) ∈ UA. Otherwise, (u,ri)  ∈ UA. γ′ is reachable from γ, and in γ′, z1 ⊒ z2 is
not true.
To prove that the problem is in coNP, we need to show that when an instance is false,
there exists evidence of size polynomial in the input that can be veriﬁed efﬁciently. The
evidence is a user u and a sequence of n state-changes from the start-state to some state γ′
such that in γ′, u is a member of the user set z2 but not of z1. We know that n is bounded
by the number of roles in the system as there can be only as many user-to-role assignment
operations for a particular user as the number of roles. The veriﬁcation of this evidence is
certainly efﬁcient. Therefore the problem is in coNP.
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56 AAR Reduce (  γ =  UA,PA,RH , q = s1 ⊒ s2,
57 ψ =  can assign,can revoke   )
58 { /* Reduction algorithm for AAR */
59 γ
T = ∅; q
T = QTrans(s1,γ
T)⊒QTrans(s2,γ
T);
60 foreach (ui,rj) ∈ UA {
61 γ
T+= HSys.rj ←−ui; γ
T+= RSys.rj ←−ui;
62 γ
T+= Sys.rj ←−RSys.rj; }
63 foreach (ri,rj) ∈ RH {
64 γ
T+= Sys.rj ←−Sys.ri; γ
T+= HSys.rj ←−HSys.ri; }
65 foreach (pi,rj) ∈ PA { γ
T+= Sys.pi←−Sys.rj; }
66 foreach (ai,s,rset) ∈ can assign {
67 if (s==true) {
68 foreach r ∈ rset {
69 γ
T+= HSys.r←−BSys.r; γ
T+= Sys.r←−ASys.r; }
70 } else { tmpRole = HTrans(s,γ
T); /* precondition */
71 foreach r ∈ rset {
72 γ
T+= HSys.r←−BSys.r ∩ tmpRole;
73 γ
T+= Sys.r←−ASys.r ∩ tmpRole; }
74 } }
75 foreach RT role name x appearing in γ
T {
76 G+=Sys.x; S+=Sys.x; G+=HSys.x; S+=HSys.x; G+=RSys.x;
77 S+=BSys.x; S+=RSys.x; S+=ASys.x;
78 } /* when a can_revoke rule exists for r, ASys.r and
79 RSys.r can shrink */
80 foreach (ai,rset) ∈ can revoke {
81 foreach r in rset { S-=RSys.r; S-=ASys.r; } }
82 return  γ
T, q
T, (G,S) ;
83 } /* End AAR Reduce */
Fig. 5. AAR Reduce: the reduction algorithm for AAR
We observe fromthe above proof that the AATU problem remains coNP-complete even
when every precondition that occurs in can assign is speciﬁed as true; the expressive
power of the queries is sufﬁcient for reducing the monotone 3SAT problem to the general
AATU problem.
4.2 Reduction for AAR
The reduction algorithm for AAR is given in Figure 5. The reduction algorithm includes in
the set of principals a principal for every user in U and ﬁve special principals: Sys, RSys,
HSys, ASys, and BSys. Again, the Sys roles simulate RBAC roles and permissions. In this
reduction, we do not distinguish whether a role assignment operation is effected by one
user or another, and use only one principal, ASys, to represent every user that exercises
the user-role assignment operation. The roles of the principal RSys contain all the initial
role memberships in UA; these may be revoked in state changes. HSys.r maintains the
history of the RBAC role r; its necessity is argued using the following scenario. A user is
a member of r1, which is the precondition for being added to another role r2. After one
assigns the user to r2 and revokes the user from r1. The user’s membership in r2 should
maintain, even though the precondition is no longer satisﬁed (a similar justiﬁcation for this
approach is provided in the context of ARBAC97 [Sandhu et al. 1999] as well). BSys is
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similar to ASys, but it is used to construct the HSys roles. An administrative operation to
try to add a user ui to the role rj is represented by adding the statement ASys.rj ←− ui
and BSys.rj ←−ui to γT. An administrative operation to revoke a user ui from the role
rj is represented by removing the statements RSys.rj ←−ui and ASys.rj ←−ui if either
exists in γT.
EXAMPLE 7. Consider the state-change rule ψ we discuss in Example 5, in which
can assign consists of the two tuples  Manager,Engineer ∧ FullTime,ProjectLead  and
 HumanResource,true,{FullTime,PartTime} , and can revoke consists of the two tu-
ples  Manager,{Engineer,ProjectLead}  and  HumanResource,{FullTime,PartTime} .
Let γ be the RBAC state shown in Figure 1, and let q be the query ProjectLead ⊒
Alice. Then, we represent the output of AATU Reduce( γ,q,ψ ) as  γT,qT,ψT . qT
is Sys.ProjectLead ⊒ {Alice}. The following RT statements in γT result from UA:
HSys.Engineer ←− Alice RSys.Engineer ←− Alice
HSys.PartTime ←− Alice RSys.PartTime ←− Alice
HSys.Manager ←− Bob RSys.Manager ←− Bob
HSys.HumanResource ←− Carol RSys.HumanResource ←− Carol
Sys.Engineer ←− RSys.Engineer Sys.FullTime ←− RSys.FullTime
Sys.HumanResource ←− RSys.HumanResource
Sys.PartTime ←− RSys.PartTime
The following statements in γT result from RH:
Sys.Employee ←− Sys.Engineer HSys.Employee ←− HSys.Engineer
Sys.Employee ←− Sys.FullTime HSys.Employee ←− HSys.FullTime
Sys.Employee ←− Sys.PartTime HSys.Employee ←− HSys.PartTime
Sys.Engineer ←− Sys.ProjectLead HSys.Engineer ←− HSys.ProjectLead
Sys.FullTime ←− Sys.Manager HSys.FullTime ←− HSys.Manager
The following statements in γT result from PA:
Sys.View ←− Sys.HumanResource Sys.Access ←− Sys.Employee
Sys.Edit ←− Sys.Engineer
The following statements in γT result from can assign:
HSys.FullTime ←− BSys.FullTime Sys.FullTime ←− ASys.FullTime
HSys.PartTime ←− BSys.PartTime Sys.PartTime ←− ASys.PartTime
Sys.NewRole1 ←− HSys.Engineer ∩ HSys.FullTime
HSys.ProjectLead ←− BSys.ProjectLead ∩ Sys.NewRole1
Sys.ProjectLead ←− ASys.ProjectLead ∩ Sys.NewRole1
ψT =  G,S , where G is the growth-restricted set of roles, and S is the shrink-restricted
set of roles. Unlike can assign, can revoke results only in some roles not being added to
S. G is comprised of all roles of the form Sys.x, HSys.x and RSys.x (but not BSys.x or
ASys.x). S is comprised of all roles of the form Sys.x, HSys.x, RSys.x and ASys.x, except
the roles RSys.Manager, ASys.Manager, RSys.Engineer, ASys.Engineer, RSys.FullTime,
ASys.FullTime, RSys.PartTime, and ASys.PartTime. This is because those roles appear
in can revoke rules, and therefore may shrink.
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There exists a state γT
1 that is reachable from γT that has the following statements in
addition to the ones in γT.
BSys.FullTime ←− Alice ASys.ProjectLead ←− Alice
We can now infer that in γT
1 , HSys.FullTime ←− Alice, and therefore,
HSys.NewRole1 ←− Alice, and so, Sys.ProjectLead ←− Alice. Thus, the security
analysis instance  γT,qT,ψT,∃  is true. If we consider, instead, the query qT
1 which is
Sys.PartTime ⊒ Alice, then as RSys.PartTime is a shrink-unrestricted role, there exists
a state γT
2 that is reachable from γT in which the statement RSys.PartTime ←− Alice is
absent. Therefore, we would conclude that Sys.ProjectLead does not include Alice. Con-
sequently, the analysis instance  ψT,qT
1 ,γT,∀  is false.
WeareabletoalsodemonstratetheneedfortherolesassociatedwiththeprincipalsHSys
and BSys. Consider the state, γT
2 that can be reached from γT
1 by removing the statement
RSys.FullTime ←− Alice. Now, Sys.FullTime does not include Alice. This is equivalent
to Carol revoking the membership of the user Alice to the role FullTime. This affects
the precondition that one can be assigned to the role ProjectLead only if one is already
a member of the roles Engineer and FullTime. Nonetheless, we observe that γT
2 ⊢ qT,
as indeed it should. That is, Alice should continue to be a member of ProjectLead even
if subsequent to her becoming a member of ProjectLead, her membership is removed
from FullTime. We observe that this is the case because the role BSys.FullTime is shrink-
restricted, and therefore one cannot remove the statement BSys.FullTime ←− Alice once
it has been added, and consequently, HSys.FullTime ←− Alice is true, and therefore Alice
continues to be a member of the role ProjectLead (i.e., is included in Sys.ProjectLead). Of
course, Alice can later have her membership revoked from the role ProjectLead (by Bob),
and this is equivalent to the statement ASys.ProjectLead ←− Alice being removed.
The following proposition asserts that the reduction is sound.
PROPOSITION 4. Given an AAR instance  γ,q,ψ,Π , let  γT,qT,ψT  =
AAR Reduce( γ,q,ψ ), then:
—Assertion 1: For every RBAC state γ′ such that γ
∗  →ψ γ′, there exists an RT[և,∩] state
γT ′ such that γT ∗  →ψT γT ′ and γ′ ⊢ q if and only if γT ′ ⊢ qT.
—Assertion 2: For every RT[և,∩] state γT ′ such that γT ∗  →ψT γT ′, there exists an RBAC
state γ′ such that γ
∗  →ψ γ′ and γ′ ⊢ q if and only if γT ′ ⊢ qT.
TheproofisinAppendixA.2. Ourcommentsregardingtheneedforassertions1and2to
preserve answers to security analysis instances, that we make in the previous section in the
context of AATU Reduce, apply to the above proposition in the context of AAR Reduce
as well. If either of the assertions does not hold, then we cannot use the answer to the
RT[և,∩] analysis instance as the answer to the corresponding RBAC instance.
THEOREM 5. An AAR instance  γ,q,ψ,Π  can be solved efﬁciently, i.e., in time poly-
nomial in the size of the instance, if q is semi-static.
PROOF. Let the output of AAR Reduce for the input  γ,q,ψ  be  γT,qT,ψT . If q is
semi-static, so is qT. As AAR Reduce runs in time polynomial in its input and qT can be
answered in time polynomial in the size of γT (which is shown by Li et al. [Li et al. 2005]),
q can be answered in time polynomial in the size of the system (i.e., the size of  γ,q,ψ ).
Thus, an AAR instance with a semi-static query can be solved efﬁciently.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.22  
THEOREM 6. An AAR instance  γ,q,ψ,Π  is coNP-complete.
PROOF. We deduce that an AAR instance is in coNP from the fact that AAR Reduce
runs in time polynomial in the size of the system, and the corresponding security analy-
sis problem in the RT[∩] system that is the output of AAR Reduce is coNP-complete.
(RT[∩] is a sub-language of RT[և,∩] that allows only the ﬁrst, second and fourth kinds
of statements from Figure 2.) That is, if q is not true in every state reachable from γ, then
we offer as counterproof the algorithm AAR Reduce and the counterproof in the RT[և,∩]
system that qT is not true in every state reachable from γT.
We can show that the general AAR problem is coNP-hard in almost exactly the same
way that we show the result for the AATU problem in the proof for Theorem 3. The only
difference is that for every role ri that is associated with a propositional variable pi, apart
from a rule in can assign, we add the rule  a,ri  to can revoke. We construct the query
q the same way as in that proof, and show in the same way that q is true in every state
reachable from γ if and only if η is valid.
5. RELATED WORK
Simple safety analysis, i.e., determining whether an access control system can reach a
state in which an unsafe access is allowed, was ﬁrst formalized by Harrison et al. [Harrison
et al. 1976] in the context of the well-known access matrix model [Lampson 1971; Graham
and Denning 1972], and was shown to be undecidable in the HRU model [Harrison et al.
1976]. There are special cases for which safety is decidable for the HRU model; safety is
decidable if (1) no subjects or objects are allowed to be created, (2) at most one condition
is used in a command but subjects or objects cannot be destroyed, or (3) only one operation
is allowed in a command.
Following that, there have been various efforts in designing access control systems
in which simple safety analysis is decidable or efﬁciently decidable, e.g., the take-grant
model [Lipton and Snyder 1977], the schematic protection model [Sandhu 1988], and the
typed access matrix model [Sandhu 1992].
One may be tempted to reduce the security analysis problem deﬁned in this paper to a
problem in one of the other models such as HRU and use existing results. However, this
approach has several difﬁculties. First, we consider different kinds of queries, while only
safety is considered in other models. It is not clear, for instance, how one would reduce
containment in RBAC to safety in HRU. Second, even when we restrict our attention to
simple safety, the reduction of either AATU or AAR into HRU results in a set of command
schemas that does not fall into any known decidable special case of HRU. (1) New users
are implicitly created when being assigned to roles. (2) Because of preconditions in AATU
and AAR, an assignment operation requires checking both the command initiator’s privi-
leges and the user’s role memberships. The resulting HRU command schema would not be
mono-conditional. (3) Adding a user to a role results in the user attaining several permis-
sions simultaneously. The resulting command in HRU is unlikely to be mono-operational.
Last but not least, even if some further restricted subcases of RBAC security analysis can
be reduced to decidable subcases of HRU, no efﬁcient algorithm exists for those cases. For
example, even in the subcase where no subjects or objects are allowed to be created, safety
analysis in HRU remains PSPACE-complete (which implies that it is NP-hard).
Recently, Li et al. [Li et al. 2005] proposed the notion of security analysis, and studied
security analysis in the context of RT[և,∩], a role-based trust management language.
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They showed that a security analysis instance in RT[և,∩] involving only semi-static
queries can be solved efﬁciently (in time polynomial in the size of the start-state in the
analysis), and for more general queries, they showed that the analysis is decidable, but
intractable.
CramptonandLoizou[CramptonandLoizou2003]claimthat“ifadministrative(orcon-
trol) permissions are assigned to subjects, then the safety problem is undecidable. Indeed,
Munawer and Sandhu [Munawer and Sandhu 1999] and Crampton [Crampton 2002] have
shown independently that the safety problem for RBAC96 is undecidable.” We disagree
with this claim, and we show in this paper that simple safety (and even more sophisticated
analysis) can be decidable when administrative permissions are given to subjects. The
simulation by Munawer and Sandhu [Munawer and Sandhu 1999] suggests only that when
an overly complicated administrative model is added to RBAC96, safety analysis may be
undecidable.
The work by Koch et al. [Koch et al. 2002a] considers safety in RBAC with the RBAC
state and state-change rules posed as a graph formalism [Koch et al. 2002b]. They show
that safety (deﬁned as whether a given graph can become a sub-graph of another graph)
is decidable provided that a state-change rule does not both remove and add components
to the graph that represents the protection state. It is not clear what import the property
of safety, as deﬁned in the context of the graph-based formalism, has in the context of
an RBAC system. In particular, it is not clear whether the notion of safety as deﬁned in
that work captures the notions of simple or bounded safety, or containment that we discuss
in Section 2.1. Also, speciﬁc complexity bounds for deciding safety are not provided in
that work, and therefore it is not clear how useful the decidability result for safety is. In
particular, we do not know whether safety can be decided efﬁciently. Furthermore, the
administrative model (set of state-change rules) considered in that work is limited in that
all roles are considered to be of the same type, and therefore roles correspond to nodes in
the graph each of which has the same label as another. Consequently, we cannot express
preconditions to user-role assignment as we can with ARBAC97 and the administrative
models considered in this paper. Such preconditions, as we discuss in Section 2.3, are
expressions formed using roles. Recently, the graph-based formalism [Koch et al. 2002b]
has been extended to consider a more realistic and ﬂexible administrative model [Koch
et al. 2004]. This new administrative model considers state-change rules that consist of
commands such as addEdge and deleteEdge. The commands do not satisfy a criterion
for the decidability of the safety property that was shown in [Koch et al. 2002a]; some of
the commands remove and add components to the graph. Whether safety (as deﬁned for
the graph-based formalism) is indeed decidable or not given the new state-change rules is
not known. Our work differs from that work in that we consider a general class of queries,
and provide speciﬁc algorithms and complexity bounds. In addition, our state-change rules
are based on ARBAC97, whose usefulness has been argued in the literature [Sandhu et al.
1999].
Previous work on ensuring security properties in RBAC takes the approach of using
constraints [Ahn and Sandhu 2000; Crampton 2003; Jaeger and Tidswell 2001]. In this ap-
proach, a set of desirable properties are explicitly speciﬁed as constraints on the relations
in an RBAC state. Each time the state of an access control system is about to change, these
constraints are checked. A change is allowed only when these constraints are satisﬁed.
We believe that security analysis and constraints are complementary. Constraints directly
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specify desirable properties on the state of an RBAC system. Security analysis uses con-
ditions speciﬁed on what kinds of state changes are allowed and infer security properties
on all reachable states. An advantage of using constraints is that sophisticated conditions
can be speciﬁed and enforced efﬁciently. In the security analysis approach, fewer security
properties can be analyzed efﬁciently, because of the need to analyze potentially inﬁnitely
many reachable states. On the other hand, the constraint approach requires that the system
controls all changes to the RBAC state, because of the need to perform constraint check-
ing. Security analysis can handle decentralized control by allowing the parts of a state that
are not controlled by the system to change freely. It can be used to help enforce security
properties even when the RBAC system itself is maintained in a decentralized manner and
one cannot ensure that constraints are checked when some part of the RBAC state changes.
Another advantage of security analysis is that it can be performed less often than checking
constraints. Analysis only needs to be performed when changes not allowed by the state-
transition rule are made, while constraints need to evaluated each time a state changes.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed the use of security analysis techniques to maintain desirable security
properties while delegating administrative privileges. More speciﬁcally, we have deﬁned a
family of security analysis problems in RBAC and two classes of problems in this family,
namely AATU and AAR, based on the URA97 component of the ARBAC97 administra-
tive model for RBAC. We have also shown that AATU and AAR can be reduced to similar
analysis problems in the RT[և,∩] trust-management language, establishing an interest-
ing relationship between RBAC and the RT (Role-based Trust-management) framework.
The reduction gives efﬁcient algorithms for answering most kinds of queries in these two
classes and helps establish the complexity bounds for the intractable cases.
While security analysis is especially effective in cases that the associated problems are
tractable, as we have demonstrated in this paper, several security analysis problems can be
intractable or even undecidable. Consequently, administrators may be constrained in the
kinds of queries they can pose or the states in which they can allow the RBAC system to be.
In any case, unless efﬁcient heuristics can be developed for the intractable cases, security
analysis may not be effective or usable.
Much work remains to be done for understanding security analysis in RBAC. The family
of RBAC security analysis deﬁned in this paper can be parameterized with more sophisti-
cated administrative models, e.g., those that allow negative preconditions, those that allow
changes to the role hierarchy or role-permission assignments, and those that allow the
speciﬁcation of constraints such as mutually exclusive roles.
Commercial products such as database management systems include support for RBAC
and for decentralized administration. We believe that security analysis will be effective
in such contexts; a detailed discussion those RBAC schemes and security analysis in their
context is part of future work. Security analysis is also applicable in several other access
control schemes, including UCON [Park and Sandhu 2004; Zhang et al. 2004; Zhang et al.
2005], which extends RBAC. The use of security analysis in such schemes is also part of
future work.
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A.1 Proof for Proposition 1
PROOF. For Assertion 1: A state change in AATU occurs when a user assignment
operation is successfully performed. For every RBAC state γ′ such that γ
∗  →ψ γ′, let
γ0,γ1,    ,γm be RBAC states such that γ = γ0  →ψ γ1  →ψ      →ψ γm = γ′. We
construct a sequence of RT[և,∩] states γT
0 ,γT
1 ,    ,γT
m as follows: γT
0 = γT; for each
i = [0..m − 1], consider the assignment operation that changes γi to γi+1, let it be the
operation in which a user u1 adds (u,r) to the user-role assignment relation; the state γT
i+1
is obtained by adding u1.r←−u to γT
i . Let γT ′ be γT
m.
Step one: Prove that if γ′ ⊢ q then γT ′ ⊢ qT. It is sufﬁcient to prove the following:
for each i ∈ [0..m], if γi implies that a certain user u is a member of a role r (or has
the permission p), then γT
i implies that u is a member of the RT[և,∩] role Sys.r (or
Sys.p). We use induction on i to prove this. The base case (i=0) follows directly from the
AATU Reduce algorithm; lines 42–44 reproduces UA, RH, PA in the RT[և,∩] state γT
0 .
For the step, assumes that the induction hypothesis holds for γ0,    ,γi, consider γi+1.
Let the operation leading to γi+1 be one in which u1 assigns u to a role r. Since both
sequences of states are increasing, we only need to consider role memberships implied by
γi+1 but not γi; these are caused (directly or indirectly) by this assignment. There must
exists a  ra,c,r  ∈ can assign to enable this assignment; thus in γi, u1 is a member of
the role ra and u satisﬁes the condition c. By induction hypothesis, in γT
i , u1 is a member
of Sys.ra and u satisﬁes the condition c. From the translation and the construction of
γT
i+1, γT
i+1 has the following statements: u1.r ←− u, Sys.r ←− Sys.ra.r, and Sys.r ←−
Sys.name ∩ tmpRole (where tmpRole corresponds to the precondition c). Furthermore,
in γT
i+1, u1 is a member of the role ra and u satisﬁes the condition c. Therefore, u is a
member of the Sys.r role in γT
i+1.
Step two: Prove that if γT ′ ⊢ qT then γ′ ⊢ q. It is sufﬁcient to show that if an RT[և,∩]
role membership is implied by γT ′, then the corresponding RBAC role membership (or
permission possession) is also implied. A detailed proof uses induction on the number of
rounds in which a bottom-up datalog evaluation algorithm outputs a ground fact. Here, we
only point out the key observations. (For details of similar proofs, see the Appendix in [Li
et al. 2005].) A RT[և,∩] role membership is proved by statements generated on lines
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42–52. The ﬁrst three cases correspond to the UA, RH, PA. For the last case, there must
exist a statement u1.r ←− u in γT ′, and it implies that u is a member of the role Sys.r.
By the construction of γT ′, the user u has been assigned to the role r during the changes
leading to γ′.
For Assertion 2: Given an RT[և,∩] state γT ′ such that γT ∗  →ψT γT ′, we can assume
without loss of generality that γT ′ adds to γT only simple member statements. Also, we
only need to consider statements deﬁning ui.rj, where ui is a user in γ and rj is a role in
γ. Consider the set of all statements in γT ′ having the form ui.rj ←−uk. For each such
statement, we perform the following operation on the RBAC state, starting from γ, have
ui assign uk to the role rj. Such an operation may not succeed either because ui is not
in the right administrative role or because uk does not satisfy the required precondition.
We repeat to perform all operations that could be performed. That is, we loop through
all such statements and repeat the loop whenever the last loop results in a new successful
assignment. Let γ′ be the resulting RBAC state. It is not difﬁcult to see that γ′ implies the
same role memberships as γT ′; using arguments similar to those used above.
A.2 Proof for Proposition 4
PROOF. For Assertion 1: A state change in AAR occurs when a user assignment or a
revocation operation is successfully performed. Given any RBAC state γ′ such that γ
∗  →ψ
γ′, let γ0,γ1,    ,γm be RBAC states such that γ = γ0  →ψ γ1  →ψ      →ψ γm = γ′.
We construct a sequence of RT[և,∩] states γT
0 ,γT
1 ,    ,γT
m as follows: γT
0 = γT; for
each i = [0..m − 1], consider the operation that changes γi to γi+1. If it is an assignment
operation in which a user u1 adds (u,r) to the user-role assignment relation; the state γT
i+1
is obtained by adding Sys.r←−u and BSys.r←−u to γT
i . For each revocation that revokes
a user u from a role r, we remove (if they exist) from the RT[և,∩] state the statements
ASys.r←−u and RSys.r←−u. Let γT ′ be γT
m.
Step 1: Prove that if γ′ ⊢ q then γT ′ ⊢ qT. Step 1a: We prove that in γT ′, HSys.r
captures all users that are ever a member of the role r at some time, i.e., for each
i ∈ [0..m], if u ∈ usersγi[r], then u is a member of the RT[և,∩] role HSys.r in γT
m ￿
SP(γT
m) |= m(HSys,r,u)
￿
. We prove this by induction on i. The basis (i = 0) is true,
since in γT we reproduce UA and RH in the deﬁnition of the HSys roles (see lines 60–
64 in Figure 5); furthermore, the HSys roles never shrink. For the step, we show that if
(u,r) ∈ UAi+1, then u is a member of the RT[և,∩] role HSys.r in γT
m. This is sufﬁcient
for proving the induction hypothesis because the effect of propagation through role hierar-
chy is captured by the deﬁnition of HSys roles. If (u,r) ∈ UAi+1, then either (u,r) ∈ UA
(in which case HSys.r←−u ∈ γT ′), or there is an assignment operation that assigns u to
r (in which case BSys.r ←− u ∈ γT ′). Let (ra,c,r) ∈ can assign be an administrative
rule used for this assignment, then in γi, the user u satisﬁes c. By induction hypothesis u’s
role memberships in γi is captured in u’s role memberships in HSys.r; therefore u would
satisfy the translated precondition tmpRole. Therefore u is a member of the role HSys.r
in γT
m (because of the statement HSys.u←−BSys.r ∩ tmpRole).
Step 1b: We prove that in γT ′ the Sys roles capture all the role memberships in γ′.
It is sufﬁcient to prove the following: let UA
′ be the user assignment relation in γ′, if
(u,r) ∈ UA
′, then u is a member of the role Sys.r in γT ′. If (u,r) ∈ UA, then either
(u,r) ∈ UA and this is never revoked (in which case RSys.r←−u ∈ γT and this statement
is never removed, therefore RSys.r←−u ∈ γT ′); or there is an assignment operation in C,
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and this assignment is not revoked after it (in which case ASys.r←−u ∈ γT ′).
Step two: Prove that if γT ′ ⊢ qT then γ′ ⊢ q. It is sufﬁcient to show that if an RT[և,∩]
role membership is implied by γT ′, then the corresponding RBAC role membership (or
permission possession) is also implied. A detailed proof uses induction on the number of
rounds in which a bottom-up datalog evaluation algorithm outputs a ground fact. Here, we
only point out the key observation. A RT[և,∩] role membership is proved by statements
generated on lines 60–65 or 71–74. The ﬁrst three cases correspond to the UA, RH, PA.
For the last case, there must exist a statement ASys.r←−u in γT ′, and it implies that u is
a member of the role Sys.r. By the construction of γT ′, the user u has been assigned to the
role r during the changes leading to γ′ and the assignment is not revoked after that.
Also, we only need to consider statements deﬁning ui.rj, where ui is a user in γ and rj
is a role in γ. Consider the set of all statements in γT ′ having the form ui.rj ←−uk. For
each such statement, we perform the following operation on the RBAC state, starting from
γ, have ui assign uk to the role rj. Such an operation may not succeed either because ui is
not in the right administrative role or because uk does not satisfy the required precondition.
We repeat to perform all operations that could be performed. That is, we loop through all
such statements and repeat the loop whenever the last loop results in a new successful
assignment. Let γ′ be the resulting RBAC state. It is not difﬁcult to see that γ′ implies the
same role memberships as γT ′; using arguments similar to those used above.
For Assertion 2: Among the RT[և,∩] roles, Sys roles and HSys roles are ﬁxed; ASys
roles can grow or shrink; RSys roles can shrink but not grow; and BSys roles can grow but
not shrink. Given an RT[և,∩] state γT ′ such that γT ∗  →ψT γT ′, we can assume without
loss of generality that γT ′ adds to γT only simple member statements. Consider the set of
all statements in γT ′ deﬁning ASys, BSys, and RSys roles. We construct the RBAC state
γ′ as follows. (1) For every statement BSys.r ←− u in γT ′, assign the user u to the role
r. Repeat through all such statements until no new assignment succeeds. Using arguments
similar to those used for proving assertion 1, it can be shown that now the RBAC roles have
the same memberships as the HSys roles. (2) Do the same thing for all the ASys.r ←−u
statements. At this point, all the role memberships for the Sys roles in γT ′ are replicated in
the RBAC roles, because all the HSys memberships have been added. (3) Remove the extra
role membership in the RBAC state, i.e., those not in the Sys roles. The ability to carry out
this step depends upon the requirement (in Deﬁnition 4) that if there is a can assign rule
for a role, then there is also revoke rule for the role.
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